

SECRET16-5 Oct 81
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NFAC - 6356/81

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6 October 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM: Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: SIG Meeting on CBW Arms Control, 5 October 1981

1. This entire memorandum is SECRET.
2. The meeting was chaired by Amb. Stoessel. Other attendees included:

State

Richard Burt
David Gompert

NSC

MG Robert Schweitzer
Sven Kraemer

ACDA


Robert Grey
Archelaus Turrentine

OSD

MG Richard Boverie

JCS


LTG Paul Gorman
Col. Bay

CIA

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3. The issues for decision at the meeting were:



State Dept. review completed

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SUBJECT: SIG Meeting on CBW Arms Control, 5 October 1981

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ACIS: [redacted] (60ct81)

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ORIGIN 55-18

INFO OCT-88 ADS-88 SSO-88 /030 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/MA/AT:RPHIKULAN
APPROVED BY ACDA, RGREY
EUR/DOV:MMCLEAN
PM/RBURI
NEA/PAB:DSMYDER-
EUR/RPH:ETHOMAS
ACDA-ATURRENTINE
ACDA-EPDWMY (SUBS)
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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 263576

EXDIS-LONDON FOR ACDA DIRECTOR ROSTOV

E.O. 12865 RDS-1 9/24/86 (GREY, ROBERT)

TAGS: PARM, UR, US
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE BW
CONVENTION

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: ACDA ACTING DIRECTOR GREY PRESENTED A US
DEMARCHE CONCERNING SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION TO SOVIET CHARGE ON OCTOBER 1.
EMBASSY MOSCOW IS REQUESTED TO REINFORCE THE DEMARCHE BY
RAISING SAME POINTS WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY. END
SUMMARY.

3. ACTING ACDA DIRECTOR GREY CALLED IN SOVIET CHARGE
BESSHERTNYKH ON OCTOBER 1 AND PRESENTED HIM THE DEMARCHE
OUTLINED BELOW (PARA 4). BEFORE PRESENTING THE DEMARCHE
GREY STATED THAT THE ISSUE WAS ONE OF EXTRAORDINARY
GRAVITY AND THAT THE DEMARCHE BEARS DIRECTLY ON THE
PROBLEM OF VERIFYING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WHICH ACDA
DIRECTOR ROSTOV HAD RAISED WITH BESSHERTNYKH
LAST AUGUST. WE WISH TO DISCUSS THE VERIFICATION
ISSUES WITH THE SOVIET SIDE AS SOON AS YOU ARE READY.
AS DIRECTOR ROSTOV NOTED IN HIS PRIOR DISCUSSION
IT IS OUR VIEW THAT WE MUST NOW COOPERATE IN THE
VERIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS BY WHATEVER
MEANS WHICH MAY TURN OUT TO BE NECESSARY AND
APPROPRIATE. TODAY'S DEMARCHE HOWEVER GOES FAR BEYOND
THE PROBLEMS OF ARMS CONTROL TO THE ROLE OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM, AND TO QUESTIONS OF HUMANITY AND THE
RELATIONSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION WITH THE PEOPLES OF
THE THIRD WORLD.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF DEMARCHE.

-- THE UNITED STATES WISHES TO RAISE A PROBLEM OF EXTREME
IMPORTANCE FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE SOVIET UNION AND FOR THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL. IT
CONCERNS SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION.

-- THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE DISCUSSED
ONE ASPECT OF THIS ISSUE -- THE OUTBREAK OF ANTHRAX IN
SVERDLOVSK -- REPEATEDLY IN THE PAST, MOST RECENTLY WHEN
THE US CHARGE IN MOSCOW TALKED WITH FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN
MINISTER KORNIYENKO IN JUNE. THE UNITED STATES WISHES,
HOWEVER, TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION ONE MORE TIME IN AN ATTEMPT
TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM.

-- THE UNITED STATES HAS STRONG REASON TO BELIEVE THAT
THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS CONVENTION. THIS CONCERN IS BASED IN PART ON THE
OUTBREAK OF ANTHRAX IN SVERDLOVSK. IT IS BASED IN PART
ON THE PRESENCE IN THE SOVIET UNION OF HEAVILY SECURED
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WHICH HAVE FEATURES WHICH SUGGEST
THAT THEIR FUNCTION IS RELATED TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. IT
IS ALSO BASED ON STRONG AND COMPELLING EVIDENCE OF THE
USE OF MYCOTOXINS BY COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

-- WITH REGARD TO THE OUTBREAK OF ANTHRAX IN SVERDLOVSK,
PREVIOUS EXCHANGES HAVE SERVED ONLY TO HEIGHTEN THE
SUSPICION THAT THE OUTBREAK WAS THE RESULT OF SOVIET
ACTIVITIES INCONSISTENT WITH THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION. THE EXPLANATION PROVIDED BY THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT THAT THE OUTBREAK WAS DUE TO NATURAL CAUSES IS
INCONSISTENT WITH INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED
STATES. AMONG THE REASONS FOR CONTINUING CONCERN ARE
REPORTS THAT THE INHALATION FORM OF ANTHRAX WAS INVOLVED
AND THE LARGE NUMBER OF DEATHS.

-- UNDERLYING US CONCERN OVER THE OUTBREAK OF ANTHRAX IS
ITS PROXIMITY TO AN UNUSUAL MILITARY FACILITY KNOWN AS
CANTONMENT 19. CANTONMENT 19 INCLUDES ANIMAL PENS,
SUGGESTING IT IS ENGAGED IN TESTS ON ANIMALS. IT
INCLUDES STRUCTURES ENCLOSED IN EARTHEN REVETMENTS WHICH
APPEAR SUITABLE FOR THE STORAGE OF EXPLOSIVES. CERTAIN
AREAS HAVE EXTRAORDINARILY STRICT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
THE SECTION WITHIN THE SOVIET MILITARY WHICH IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROGRAMS IS KNOWN
TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH A FACILITY IN SVERDLOVSK. THE
UNITED STATES IS AWARE OF OTHER MILITARY FACILITIES
ELSEWHERE IN THE SOVIET UNION WHICH HAVE SIMILAR
CHARACTERISTICS, SUGGESTING THAT THEY MAY BE ENGAGED IN
ILLICIT BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES.

-- THE SOVIET UNION HAS FAILED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
REPEATED CONTACTS ON SVERDLOVSK TO PROVIDE INFORMATION
WHICH MIGHT ALLAY OUR CONCERN. INSTEAD, THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT HAS DENIED THAT THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION IS INVOLVED AND QUESTIONED US SERIOUSNESS IN
RAISING THE ISSUE. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IS INVOLVED AND HAS
REPEATEDLY RAISED THE ISSUE PRECISELY BECAUSE IT IS
SERIOUS ABOUT ARMS CONTROL AND ABOUT THE NEED TO COMPLY
WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. THE UNCOOPERATIVE REACTION
OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE V
OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.

-- NOW NEW INFORMATION ABOUT THE USE OF TOXIN WEAPONS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA HAS ADDED AN ADDITIONAL DIMENSION TO THIS
ISSUE. THREE LETHAL TOXINS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN A

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SAMPLE FROM KAMPUCHEA -- SUBSTANCES WHOSE USE IN WAR IS CLEARLY PROHIBITED UNDER THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL AND RELATED RULES OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND WHOSE POSSESSION OR MANUFACTURE FOR SUCH PURPOSES IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION. THE SYMPTOMS PRODUCED BY THESE TOXINS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE BIZARRE EFFECTS REPORTED BY EYEWITNESSES AND BY VICTIMS OF CERTAIN LETHAL ATTACKS IN KAMPUCHEA. THEY ARE ALSO CONSISTENT WITH THE EFFECTS OF ATTACKS WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN LAOS AND IN AFGHANISTAN.

-- IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS SUPPORTING THE VIETNAMESE IN THEIR INVASION OF KAMPUCHEA. SOVIET PERSONNEL HAVE FUNCTIONED IN AN ADVISORY ROLE ON MATTERS RELATED TO CHEMICAL WARFARE THERE, AND NUMEROUS REPORTS DIRECTLY LINK THE SOVIET UNION TO ATTACKS WITH LETHAL AGENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA. THE THREE SPECIFIC TRICHOCECENE TOXINS FOUND DO NOT OCCUR NATURALLY TOGETHER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. NO KNOWN FACILITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA COULD PRODUCE THE TOXINS IN THE QUANTITIES NECESSARY TO CAUSE THE EFFECTS REPORTED, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION COULD PRODUCE THEM. RESEARCH PROJECTS CONCERNING TRICHOCECENE TOXINS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AT VARSAN PACT INSTITUTES PREVIOUSLY ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS RESEARCH.

-- THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS CLEAR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION. ACCORDING TO ARTICLE I, EACH PARTY COMMITS ITSELF NEVER TO DEVELOP, PRODUCE, STOCKPILE OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRE OR RETAIN BIOLOGICAL

AGENTS OR TOXINS FOR HOSTILE PURPOSES.

-- ARTICLE III FORBIDS PARTIES TO TRANSFER SUCH BIOLOGICAL AGENTS OR TOXINS TO ANY RECIPIENT OR TO ASSIST OR ENCOURAGE ANY STATE IN THEIR ACQUISITION OR MANUFACTURE.

-- ARTICLE V REQUIRES THE PARTIES TO CONSULT AND COOPERATE IN SOLVING ANY PROBLEMS WHICH MAY ARISE WITH RESPECT TO THE CONVENTION.

-- IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION, THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS A PROMPT MEETING INVOLVING TECHNICAL EXPERTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES TO EXAMINE THESE ISSUES FULLY AND TO DISCUSS MEANS BY WHICH THESE CONCERNS MIGHT BE ALLAYED.

-- SPECIFICALLY WITH REGARD TO THE USE OF TOXINS, THE UNITED STATES EXPECTS THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL ACT SO AS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THESE INCIDENTS. THE UNITED STATES ALSO EXPECTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE UN INVESTIGATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE AND THAT IT WILL STRONGLY ENCOURAGE THE GOVERNMENTS OF AFGHANISTAN, LAOS AND VIETNAM TO COOPERATE FULLY AS WELL.

-- THE UNITED STATES ASKS FOR A PROMPT AND POSITIVE REPLY TO THESE REQUESTS. THE POSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING THIS MATTER THROUGH BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IS ALMOST EXHAUSTED, AND THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO TAKE ITS CONCERNS TO OTHER FORA. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A FAILURE TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER ARE EXTREMELY SERIOUS FOR THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL, AS WELL AS FOR US/SOVIET RELATIONS.

END TEXT.

5. BESSMERHNYKH NOTED THAT SECRETARY HAIG AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO HAD DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE BRIEFLY AND THAT

GROMYKO HAD ALREADY REJECTED U.S. CHARGES AS UNFOUNDED. BESSMERHNYKH STATED THAT THERE IS NO FACTUAL BASIS TO PROVIDE FOR THE DISCUSSIONS SUGGESTED BY US AND THAT IF THIS IS WHAT U.S. MEANS BY VERIFICATION THERE IS NOTHING TO TALK ABOUT. HE SAID THAT FROM THE WAY THE U.S. HAS HANDLED THIS MATTER WAS CLEARLY A PROPAGANDA ISSUE AND THAT EACH OF THE CHARGES IS COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED.

6. GREY, PM DIRECTOR BURT AND AMBASSADOR ROWNY (SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR NEGOTIATIONS) MADE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. CONSIDERS THIS MATTER AS MOST SERIOUS AND THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR THE SOVIETS TO ASSUME THAT WE ARE APPROACHING IT AS A PROPAGANDA ISSUE. IT WAS STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WOULD LIKE TO CLEAR UP THESE PROBLEMS SO PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN ARMS CONTROL. WITHOUT A SATISFACTORY RESOLUTION, IT WAS INDICATED THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF UPCOMING ARMS CONTROL TALKS WOULD BE MADE MORE DIFFICULT.

7. BESSMERHNYKH SAID THAT HIS RESPONSE HAD BEEN PRELIMINARY AND THAT HE WOULD PASS ON THE DEMARCHE TO MOSCOW.

8. FOR MOSCOW CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO REINFORCE U.S. CONCERNS BY PRESENTING DEMARCHE PARA 4 ABOVE TO APPROPRIATE SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

9. KABUL MIIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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U.S. ARMS CONTROL
AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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